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ABSTR ACT: On the Slovenian-Austrian border cross-zonal capacities (CZCs) are currently
allocated at explicit auctions, although in the future to comply with the European Target Electricity Model one can expect implicit auctions within market coupling to be implemented. Via
a simulation, this paper aims to study the impact of implicit electricity market coupling on the
Slovenian-Austrian border on the efficiency of CZC allocation and social welfare in Slovenia.
The simulation results show that the use of implicit auctions would increase the efficiency
of CZC allocation, reduce the price of electricity and increase the volume of trading in the
Slovenian electricity exchange market. Further, implicit market coupling on the SlovenianAustrian border would increase social welfare in Slovenia.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Electricity trading is conducted on the basis of long- and short-term contracts for the
purchase or sale of electricity without constraints within an individual country in the EU.
However, cross-zonal trading on energy borders among EU member states is limited by
cross-zonal capacities (CZCs) (Meeus, Vandezande, Cole & Belmans, 2009). CZCs can
be allocated by transmission network system operators (TSOs) by using various nonmarket- or market-based methods.3 As non-market methods are prohibited by legislation
(Regulation (EC) 1228/2003), since 2006 CZCs have been allocated at explicit or implicit
auctions on all energy borders within the EU (Zachmann, 2008).
1 BSP Regional Energy Exchange LL C, Ljubljana, Slovenia, e-mail: anze.predovnik@bsp-southpool.com
2 University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Economics, Ljubljana, Slovenia, e-mail: matej.svigelj@ef.uni-lj.si
3 For a more detailed explanation of the market and non-market methods of allocating CZCs, see Kristiansen
(2007a).
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At explicit auctions, orders for the purchase of CZCs are submitted separately from orders
for the purchase or sale of electricity. Each cross-border electricity trade consists of two
transactions: the purchase of CZCs at an explicit auction and the purchase or sale of
electricity in a bilateral or exchange market. When CZCs are being allocated at exchange
markets at the same time as orders for the purchase and sale of electricity, this is referred
to as an implicit auction (Kladnik, Artač, Štokelj & Gubina, 2010).
In July 2011, the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) published
the Framework Guidelines on Capacity Allocation and Congestion Management for
Electricity in compliance with the requirements of Regulation (EC) 714/2009 and defined
the method of implicit auctions within market coupling for the Target Electricity Model
for short-term CZC allocation within the EU (ACER, 2011).4
The main measures used to evaluate whether CZC allocation is better by means of implicit
auctions than through explicit auctions are the better price convergence and greater
efficiency of CZC allocation (Jullien, Pignon, Robin & Staropoli, 2012).5
Greater efficiency in CZC allocation enables TSOs and market participants to have
larger volumes of cross-border trade and quality price signals for the value of CZCs.
Consequently, TSOs have a more accurate basis for decision-making with regard to
investments in the transmission network and for market participants with regard to the
cross-zonal purchase or sale of electricity. An improvement in CZC allocation efficiency is
therefore also reflected in greater social welfare (Kristiansen, 2007a).
The unified and competitive ”Northern Market” is regarded as the first example of price
market coupling in Europe. The Northern Market developed gradually. In 1991, the
Norwegian National Exchange Market was established, which by 2000 was liaising with
the neighbouring four countries and had grown into a regional market. Sweden joined in
1996, Finland in 1998, part of western Denmark in 1999, and eastern Denmark in 2000
(NordPool, 2004).
Northern Market integration was followed by the trilateral price market coupling (TLC)
of the Belgian, French and Dutch markets in 2006. The German and French markets were
price coupled in 2007. In 2009 and 2010, the German market integrated with the Danish
and Swedish markets through volume market coupling. In 2010, the TLC was merged with
the price market coupling of the German and French markets in a unified price market
coupling of the Central West Region (CWE). In the same year, the Polish and Swedish
markets were price coupled as well. The Slovenian market joined the market coupling
implementation processes in January 2011 when the Slovenian and Italian markets were
price coupled. In the same year, the Norwegian and Dutch markets were also merged
4 Market coupling can take the form of either price or volume market coupling. With price market coupling,
the trading platform algorithm is able to determine prices, quantities and flows for each of the coupled markets, whereas with volume market coupling only the net flows across the borders are calculated (Pellini, 2012).
5 For a more detailed description of the differences between explicit and implicit auctions, see Jullien et al.
(2012) and Belpex (n.d.).
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through volume market coupling (Farrington, 2011). The Czech and Slovak markets were
price coupled on 31 August 2009 (SEPSAS, 2009). Since 1 April 2010, the Finnish and
Estonian markets have been price coupled as well (Tere, 2010). Since 11 September 2012,
the Hungarian market has been price coupled with the Slovak/Czech markets (CEPS,
2012).
The coupled markets or regions differ due to their use of various trading systems,
market rules, and exchange markets closing times. For this reason, six power exchanges
(APX, Belpex, EPEX, GME, NordPool and OMIE) joined forces in a project to integrate
the regional markets to form a joint European market through which the mentioned
differences are being dealt with (Farrington, 2011).
ELES, the Slovenian TSO, and BSP, the Slovenian electricity exchange, have been engaged
in CZC allocation on the Slovenian-Italian border through implicit auctions since January
2011. On the Slovenian-Austrian border, CZCs are allocated by means of explicit auctions.
Since this is not in compliance with the ACER target model, it is expected that in the future
implicit auctions will be carried out on this border as well. Although on the SlovenianCroatian border CZCs are allocated through explicit auctions, the CZC allocation will not
be changing in the near future because there is no active power exchange in Croatia and
so it is not possible to conduct implicit auctions. There are no interconnectors between
Slovenia and Hungary and CZCs are thus not allocated on the border between these two
countries.
The purpose of this paper is to study the impact of implementing implicit auctions on
the Slovenian-Austrian border in the Slovenian electricity exchange market by means
of a simulation. We investigate whether implementing implicit auctions on this border
would be more effective than the existing explicit auctions in terms of CZC allocation.
In addition, the impact of implicit auctions on the Slovenian-Austrian border on social
welfare in Slovenia is analysed.
In the paper, we verify the hypotheses that, following the implementation of implicit
auctions on the Slovenian-Austrian border the electricity price differences between the
Slovenian and Austrian electricity exchange markets will decrease (H1), the average
electricity price in the Slovenian electricity exchange market will decrease (H2), the
efficiency of the available CZC utilisation will increase (H3), the trading volume in the
Slovenian electricity exchange market will rise (H4) and that social welfare in Slovenia
will increase (H5).
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of the literature on
electricity market integration and on different capacity allocation mechanisms. In section
3, we present the theoretical background on how CZC allocation influences social welfare.
In section 4, we describe the data and outline the simulation of implicit auctions on the
Slovenian-Austrian border. In section 5, we analyse the results of the simulation. Finally,
the findings and conclusions are summarised in section 6.
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW
The economic literature on electricity market integration and capacity allocation
mechanisms can be classified in three main categories. The first category consists of
literature that analyses the impact of different market integration models on the degree of
competition in electricity markets. The second category highlights the inefficiencies of the
explicit auction mechanism for allocating CZC. The third category researches the impact
of introducing implicit auctions on the efficiency of allocating CZC and on social welfare.
Borenstein, Bushnell and Stoft (2000) show that the introduction of a transmission
capacity between two separated symmetric monopoly markets fosters competition and,
moreover, that even a modest expansion of transmission capacity between markets that
suffer from market power problems may have very high payoffs in terms of increased
competition in electricity markets. Harvey and Hogan (2000) explore the comparative
effects on competition of nodal pricing vs. zonal pricing and conclude that nodal pricing
supports the market and expands the range of tools available to mitigate market power.
Joskow and Tirole (2000) provide a study of the effects of market coupling/splitting
bid-based pools with financial transmission contracts and bilateral contracting systems
organised with tradable physical transmission contracts in constrained two-node and
three-node networks. In their study, they argue that physical transmission contract rights
may have worse welfare effects than financial transmission contracts rights because they
can be withheld from the market, thereby reducing effective transmission capacity and
introducing production inefficiency. Further, Neuhoff (2004) explores the comparative
effects on competition of market coupling/splitting with financial transmission contracts
vs. bilateral trading with physical transmission contracts and concludes that market
coupling/splitting reduces the market power of generation companies compared to a
market design relying on bilateral trading with physical transmission contracts. Gilbert,
Neuhoff and Newbery (2004) extend previous studies by analysing a larger range of cases
for different market designs and by studying welfare effects when transmission rights
are obtained in an auction or inherited as legacy rights. Ehrenmann and Smeers (2005)
and later on Ehrenmann and Neuhoff (2009) explore the comparative welfare effects of
introducing two different capacity allocation design options (an integrated market design
or a coordinated transmission auction) and demonstrate that an integrated market design
performed better. In addition, Jullien et al. (2012) compare the two design options and
come to the same conclusion that an integrated market design is more efficient than a
coordinated transmission auction.
The second category of the literature provides an assessment of the inefficiencies of the
explicit auction mechanism for allocating CZC. Analysing the results of auctions held for
the Dutch-German interconnector and for the French-England interconnector, Newbery
and McDaniel (2002) find that with explicit auctions CZCs are underused as a result of no
flows netting. Moreover, imperfect arbitrage is present as the average price of daily capacity
is lower than the monthly and annual prices. Similarly, while assessing the performance
of the Kontek cable and of the interconnector between West Denmark and Germany
Kristiansen (2007b) also finds evidence of imperfect arbitrage. Bunn and Zachmann
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(2010) demonstrate that with an explicit auction, a generator which is both a dominant
player in one market and a competitive player in another, has an incentive to acquire
transmission rights to export against the price differential, thus resulting in inefficient use
of cross-border interconnections. In addition, Bunn and Zachmann (2010) claim these
inefficiencies occur because the energy and transmission markets are decoupled through
the ex ante nature of the capacity auctions. Implicit auction approaches with nodal pricing
would preclude these inefficiencies. Meeus (2011) computes a performance indicator for
no-coupling, volume market coupling and price market coupling auction mechanisms on
the Kontek Cable between Denmark and Germany and finds that price coupling is able to
outperform both no-coupling and volume-market coupling.
The third category of the literature focuses on the impact of implicit auctions on the efficiency
of allocating CZCs and on social welfare in the integrated markets. Hobbs, Rijkers and
Boots (2005) analyse the potential impact of market coupling for the Belgian and the Dutch
markets before the start of the Trilateral Coupling project among Belgium, France and
the Netherlands. The authors estimate the project’s welfare effect by simulating a Cournot
Nash equilibrium model with five alternative market settings. The results show that, if the
Belgian incumbent plays strategically, the change in the aggregate social surplus due to the
market coupling is quite significant, but it occurs at the expense of Dutch consumers. On
the other hand, when the Belgian incumbent acts as a price-taker, market coupling brings
about a smaller increase in the aggregate social surplus, but it is more equally distributed
among Belgian and Dutch consumers. Finon and Romano (2009) analyse the effect of
market integration on electricity prices, showing that consumers living in countries with
a high variable cost of capacity enjoy a price fall at the expense of consumers living in
countries with a low cost capacity. Similarly, Pellini (2012) analyses the impact of market
coupling in the Italian electricity market and confirms that, in the Italian case, market
coupling maximises the use of the interconnection capacity with neighbouring countries,
allows flows-netting, eliminates inefficient arbitrage that may occur with the explicit
auction mechanism and increases the welfare gain of the coupled markets.
There are also some studies investigating the market coupling of the Slovenian and Italian
electricity markets. The study of GME, Borzen and BSP (2008) identifies four efficiency
gains from the adoption of implicit auctions on the Slovenian-Italian border. Namely, lower
operational risks, lower trading risk/cost, higher liquidity of markets and more efficient use
of the interconnection capacity. In addition, while analysing price convergence between
the Slovenian and Italian electricity markets after the implementation of market coupling
Parisio and Pelagatti (2014) find that the two markets are still far from being strongly
integrated in terms of prices. Further, Cavaliero (2013) shows that the introduction of
implicit auctions on the Slovenian-Italian border has influenced the efficiency of CZC
allocation since in 2011 and 2012 the cross-border flows determined by market coupling
resulted to be efficient in 100% of cases, compared with 98.2% guaranteed by the previous
mechanism based on an explicit auction.
An empirical assessment of the effect of the market integration of the Slovenian and
Austrian electricity markets from introducing implicit auctions on the Slovenian-
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Austrian border is still to be carried out. Therefore, this paper aims to contribute to the
empirical literature on market integration, presenting a comprehensive investigation on
the efficiency of the CZC allocation and the welfare effect caused by the use of implicit
auctions on the Slovenian-Austrian border.
3. CAPACITY ALLOCATION AND SOCIAL WELFARE
Connecting two isolated electricity exchange markets is possible if interconnectors or
CZCs are available. In order to conduct cross-border electricity transactions, a market
participant has to gain the right to use CZCs. The CZCs of an individual interconnector
pose a quantity constraint on trading between the two markets (Neuhoff, 2004).
If the CZCs are not fully utilised and there is no transmission network congestion between
the two markets, electricity prices in both markets are equalised (Figure 1). Let us assume
that at the beginning the electricity price (PA) in Market A is lower than the electricity
price (PB) in Market B and therefore Market A will export electricity to Market B. Exported
electricity is bought in the export area of Market A (additional purchase of electricity in
Market A shifting the position of demand D0 to position D1), and is sold in the import area
of Market B (additional selling of electricity in Market B shifting the position of supply S0
to position S1). Consequently the electricity price in Market A will increase and decrease
in Market B. If CZCs for the export of electricity from Market A to Market B are sufficient,
the prices in both markets will equalise P*A = P*B (Adamec, Indrakova, & Pavlatka, 2009).6
The producer surplus in Market A increases since the electricity produced in this market
can be sold by the producers at a higher price than before the market coupling (area
a+b+c). The consumer surplus in Market B increases as well because the electricity in this
market can be purchased by consumers at a lower price than before the market coupling
(area d+e+f) (Figure 1) (Jacottet, 2012). On the contrary, the consumer surplus in Market
A decreases since consumers have to purchase electricity at a higher price than before the
market coupling (area a+b). Further, the producer surplus in Market B is also decreased
because the electricity produced in this market can be sold by the producers at a lower
price than before the market coupling (area d) (Figure 1) (Jacottet, 2012).

6 For mathematical proof that market prices equalise if there are no CZC constraints between two or more
markets, see Coenraad (2011).
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Figure 1: Social welfare effects of market coupling with an uncongested interconnection

Sources: Adapted from Jacottet, 2012; Adamec et al., 2009.

Sources: Adapted from Jacottet, 2012; Adamec et al., 2009.
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The social welfare of two coupled markets between which CZCs are fully utilised is greater
than the social welfare of two isolated Markets A and B when calculating the net benefits
due to the increased exports in Market A (area c) and the net benefits from the increased
imports in Market B (area e+f) and the congestion rent (area g) (Figure 2). Areas c, e, f
and g represent the increase in social welfare due to the coupling of two markets with CZC
constraints (E-Bridge, 2009). The increase in social welfare due to the coupling of two
markets with CZC constraints is smaller than with the coupling of two markets where the
CZCs are not constrained (Coenraad, 2011).
Figure 2: Social welfare effects of market coupling with a congested interconnection
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4.1. Data
sources between the two markets (Consentec & Frontier Economics, 2004).
4.

MARKET COUPLING SIMULATION ON THE SLOVENIAN-AUSTRIAN BORDER

Data were acquired from various sources. Data on CZCs on the Slovenian-Austrian border were acquired from the
Central Allocation Office website (CAO, n.d.). Data on CZCs on the Slovenian-Italian border and data on offers
for purchases or sales in the Slovenian day-ahead market were acquired from the internal materials of the
Slovenian electricity exchange – BSP (BSP, 2012). Data regarding the price on the day-ahead market on the Italian
electricity market were acquired from the Italian electricity exchange website – GME (GME, n.d.). Data regarding
the price on the day-ahead market on the Austrian electricity market were acquired from the Austrian electricity
exchange website – EXAA (EXAA, n.d.).
Data were based on an hourly level for all 365 days or 8,784 hours in 2012 during which electricity was traded.
The data consist of 351,196 offers for the sale of electricity on the Slovenian day-ahead market and 241,784 offers
for the purchase of electricity on the Slovenian day-ahead market. In addition, 17,566 CZCs on the SlovenianItalian border, 17,566 CZCs on the Slovenian-Austrian border, 8,784 prices of electricity in the Italian day-ahead
market and 8,784 prices of electricity in the Austrian day-ahead market were used.
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4. MARKET COUPLING SIMULATION ON THE SLOVENIAN-AUSTRIAN
BORDER
4.1. Data sources
Data were acquired from various sources. Data on CZCs on the Slovenian-Austrian border
were acquired from the Central Allocation Office website (CAO, n.d.). Data on CZCs on
the Slovenian-Italian border and data on offers for purchases or sales in the Slovenian
day-ahead market were acquired from the internal materials of the Slovenian electricity
exchange – BSP (BSP, 2012). Data regarding the price on the day-ahead market on the
Italian electricity market were acquired from the Italian electricity exchange website –
GME (GME, n.d.). Data regarding the price on the day-ahead market on the Austrian
electricity market were acquired from the Austrian electricity exchange website – EXAA
(EXAA, n.d.).
Data were based on an hourly level for all 365 days or 8,784 hours in 2012 during which
electricity was traded. The data consist of 351,196 offers for the sale of electricity on the
Slovenian day-ahead market and 241,784 offers for the purchase of electricity on the
Slovenian day-ahead market. In addition, 17,566 CZCs on the Slovenian-Italian border,
17,566 CZCs on the Slovenian-Austrian border, 8,784 prices of electricity in the Italian dayahead market and 8,784 prices of electricity in the Austrian day-ahead market were used.
4.2. Reference scenario
Prior to assuming the implementation of implicit auctions on the Slovenian-Austrian
border, short-term CZCs are being allocated at explicit auctions. Consequently, according
to the gained rights to use CZCs at explicit auctions and their business strategy, Slovenian
market participants can enter their offers for the purchase and sale of electricity in the
order book of the Slovenian electricity exchange market and Austrian market participants
in the order book of the Austrian electricity exchange market. Since the Slovenian
electricity exchange market is connected to the Italian electricity exchange market via
implicit auctions within the market coupling, the order book of the Slovenian market is
combined with the order book of the Italian electricity exchange market.
The calculations of actual/reference trading results were made with the EuroMarket trading
system that is used by the Italian and Slovenian electricity exchanges (Mercatoelettrico,
n.d.). The trading results in the Slovenian electricity exchange market were calculated on
an hourly basis for all hours of the leap year 2012 based on data from the common order
book of the Slovenian and Italian electricity exchange markets, taking into account that
the rights to use CZCs on the Slovenian-Italian border were allocated at implicit auctions.7
7 As the Slovenian and Italian electricity exchange markets were coupled in 2011, the calculation of both
the reference and the simulation scenario also needs to consider the Italian electricity exchange market (the
northern zone).
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In addition, the short-term CZCs on the Slovenian-Austrian border allocated at explicit
auctions were also used in the reference scenario. Results calculated on such bases are
treated as the reference scenario.
4.3. Simulation scenario
For the purposes of analysing the impact of using implicit auctions on the SlovenianAustrian border in the Slovenian electricity exchange market, the explicit auctions for
allocating CZCs on the Slovenian-Austrian border are replaced by a simulation of the use
of implicit auctions for allocating CZCs on that border.
In the simulations for the Slovenian-Austrian border and the Slovenian-Italian border, the
rights to use CZCs are granted at the same time as offers for the purchase or sale of electricity.
The calculations of the trading results of the simulation scenario were conducted by a
programmed calculation in Excel that simulates the operation of the EuroMarket trading
system algorithm. The programmed calculation was based on the assumptions explained
in section 4.3.1. The trading results in the Slovenian electricity exchange market were
calculated on an hourly basis for all hours of the leap year 2012 based on data from the
common order book of the Slovenian, Italian and Austrian electricity exchange markets,
taking into account that the rights to use CZCs on the Slovenian-Italian border and on the
Slovenian-Austrian border are allocated at implicit auctions. Results calculated on such
bases and with such a simulation are treated as the simulation scenario.
4.3.1. Assumptions
In 2012, the Italian market price for the northern zone (PGME_Nord) was higher than the
Slovenian market price (PBSP) for 6,962 hours, which means that Slovenia exported
electricity with the utilisation of complete CZCs in the direction Slovenia-Italy. For
1,800 hours, the Italian market price for the northern zone (PGME_Nord) was the same as
the Slovenian market price (PBSP), where electricity was imported into Slovenia for 14
hours with the utilisation of part of the CZCs in the direction Italy-Slovenia, and for 1,786
hours electricity was exported from Slovenia with the utilisation of part of the CZCs in
the direction Slovenia-Italy. For 22 hours, the Italian market price for the northern zone
(PGME_Nord) was lower than the Slovenian market price (PBSP), which means that electricity
was imported into Slovenia with the utilisation of complete CZCs in the direction ItalySlovenia (Table 1).
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Table 1: Imports and exports of electricity from/to the Italian exchange market in 2012
Total
hours

PBSP > PGME_Nord
PBSP < PGME_Nord
PBSP = PGME_Nord

22
6,962
1,800

Number of
hours with
IM and EX
from/to IT
0
0
0

Total

8,784

0

Number of
hours with
one-way IM
from IT
22
0
14

Number of
hours with
one-way EX
to IT
0
6,962
1,786

36

8,748

Number of
Number of
hours with full hours with full
CZC utilisation CZC utilisation
from IT
to IT
22
0
0
6,962
0
0
22

6,962

Sources: GME, n.d.; BSP, n.d.; CAO, n.d.
To sum up, in 2012 Slovenia exported electricity to Italy for 8,748 hours, or 99.5% of the
time. Consequently, CZCs for the direction Slovenia-Italy represented additional demand
in the Slovenian electricity exchange market. For 36 hours, or 0.4% of the time, Slovenia
imported electricity from Italy, which means that CZCs for the direction Italy-Slovenia
represented additional supply in the Slovenian electricity exchange market (Table 1).
Due to the small quantities of CZCs between the countries, the cross-zonal demand or
offer of the Slovenian electricity exchange market cannot influence the aggregate demand
or aggregate supply in the Italian electricity exchange market to such an extent that would
cause the price in the Italian electricity exchange market to change. For this reason, we
assume that in the Italian electricity exchange market the Slovenian electricity exchange
market appears as an additional buyer (buying electricity up to the extent of the maximum
CZCs for the direction Italy-Slovenia) when the Italian electricity exchange price is lower
than the Slovenian electricity exchange price. In addition, we also assume that in the
Italian electricity exchange market the Slovenian electricity exchange market appears as
an additional seller (selling electricity up to the extent of the maximum CZCs for the
direction Slovenia-Italy) when the Italian electricity exchange price is higher than the
Slovenian electricity exchange price.
Similarly as for the Italian electricity exchange market, we analyse the differences in
electricity prices between the Slovenian and Austrian electricity exchange markets (Table
2). In 2012, the Austrian electricity exchange price (PEXAA) was higher than Slovenian
electricity exchange price (PBSP) for 2,107 hours (within these hours electricity was
exported from Slovenia with the utilisation of complete CZCs in the direction SloveniaAustria in 38 hours), for 127 hours Austrian electricity exchange price (PEXAA) was the
same as Slovenian electricity exchange price (PBSP) and for 6,550 hours Austrian electricity
exchange price (PEXAA) was lower than the Slovenian electricity exchange price (PBSP)
(within these hours electricity was imported from Austria with the utilisation of complete
CZCs in the direction Austria-Slovenia in 2,180 hours).
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Table 2: Imports and exports of electricity from/to the Austrian exchange market in 2012
Total
hours

PBSP > PEXAA
PBSP < PEXAA
PBSP = PEXAA

6,550
2,107
127

Number of
hours with
IM and EX
from/to AT
3,356
1,930
110

Total

8,784

5,396

Number of
hours with
one-way IM
from AT
3,140
103
17

Number of
hours with
one-way EX
to AT
54
74
0

Number of
hours with full
CZC utilisation
from AT
2,180
38
0

Number of hours
with full CZC
utilisation
to AT
0
0
0

3,260

128

2,218

0

Sources: EXAA, n.d.; BSP, n.d.; CAO, n.d.
On the basis of the data shown in Table 2, we can determine the following: in 2012, for
3,214 hours (3,140 hours + 74 hours), or 36.6% of the time, electricity was exchanged in
the direction from the lower towards the higher price range; for 157 hours (103 hours + 54
hours), or 1.8% of the time, from the higher towards the lower price range; for 17 hours,
or 0.2% of the time, it was exchanged at equal prices between the two price ranges; and for
5,396 hours (3,356 hours + 1,930 hours + 110 hours), or 61.4% of the time, it was exported
from the lower to the higher price range, and at the same time imported from the higher
to the lower price range.
For the market participants which imported electricity from the higher to the lower price
range in the above examples, we can assume that they had wrong expectations regarding
in which of the neighbouring electricity markets a higher price would be formed and
in which a lower one. This clearly shows the inefficiency of the explicit two-step CZCs
allocation method in which market participants first have to participate in explicit auctions
for allocating CZCs and then trade in electricity in two neighbouring markets on the basis
of predictions made about the price differences between these two markets.
The Austrian electricity exchange market has great depth since this market is indefinitely
connected to the German electricity exchange market (the CZCs between the two
markets are in excess). Consequently, CZCs on the Slovenian-Austrian border and
the cross-zonal demand or offer of the Slovenian electricity exchange market cannot
influence the aggregate demand or aggregate supply in the Austrian electricity exchange
market to such an extent that would cause the price in the Austrian electricity exchange
market to change.
When simulating the market coupling on the Slovenian-Austrian border, we assume that
electricity would be exported from Slovenia to Austria (to the extent of the maximum
CZCs for the direction Slovenia-Austria) when the Austrian electricity exchange price
is higher than the Slovenian electricity exchange price, and that electricity would be
imported from Austria to Slovenia (to the extent of the maximum CZCs for the direction
Austria-Slovenia) when the Austrian electricity exchange price is lower than the Slovenian
electricity exchange price. The CZCs that are assumed to be available for implicit allocation
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via the electricity exchange market are calculated as the difference between the net transfer
capacity (NTC) 8 and already allocated transfer capacity (AAC).9
4.4. Social welfare calculation10
4.4.1. The Slovenian electricity exchange market before the use of implicit auctions on
the Slovenian-Austrian border

Before using implicit auctions on the Slovenian-Austrian border, the order books of the
Slovenian and Austrian electricity exchange markets were not directly linked. On the
Slovenian-Austrian border, CZCs are allocated through explicit auctions. The aggregate
demand curve (Pd=fd(Qi)) and aggregate supply curve (Ps=fs(Qi)) in the Slovenian
electricity exchange market are step functions. The two step functions are constructed
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exchange
market
arearestep
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Thefor
two
from
the historical
buy and
sell bids
(which
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thestep
buy functions
and sell are constructe
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buy andtosell
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buy and
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accordingly to their
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their
taking
into account
theirfor
price
andsell
time
stamp)
into
account
their
priceexchange
level
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PCZC, AT-SI is the price of the CZCs allocated at an explicit auction in the direction Austria-Slovenia;
Q
CZC, AT-SI is the amount of the CZCs allocated at an explicit auction in the direction Austria-Slovenia.
where:
PCZC, AT-SI is the price of the CZCs allocated at an explicit auction in the direction Austria-Slovenia;
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(4)
follows: 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴−𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = (𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴−𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴−𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 )/2

where: 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
where:
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴−𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = (𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴−𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴−𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 )/2
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− 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 |) ∗ 𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆
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(5)
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = ((|𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺_𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 − 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 |) ∗ 𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 )/2
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surplus
surplus (PS*), and the acquired congestion rent on
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the (CS*),
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Congestion rent of the Slovenian TSO accounts for half of the congestion rent acquired on the SI-AT and SI-IT border as regu
agreement between the pertinent TSOs.
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for an individual hour in 2012 after market coupling on the Slovenian-Austrian border
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∗
In addition, the calculation of the congestion rent on the Slovenian-Austrian border (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
) for an
hour
in 2012
after
market
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the Slovenian-Austrian border slightly changes and is calculated a
slightly
changes
and
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as on
follows:

∗
In addition, the calculation∗of the congestion
border (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
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∗ 𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆_𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
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− 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵
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∆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + ∆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
∆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆∆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆
= ∆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶=+∆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
∆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ++∆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
∆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = ∆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + ∆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + ∆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶

(7)
(7)
(7)

∗
∗
∗
∗
∗− (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴−𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 +
∗ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 )) (8)
∗ 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
∆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆∆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆
= (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶=
−(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)∗+−(𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)
+ ((𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
(8)
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 ) 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
(𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)−+
− ∗𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)++𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶((𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
+ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 ) − (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴−𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,
∗
∆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ∗ − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶) + (𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ∗ − 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶) + ((𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
+ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 ) − (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴−𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 )) (8)
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electricity exchange price (PEXAA) and the Slovenian electricity exchange price (P*BSP) after
implementing implicit auctions.
Based on the results of the analysis, we may conclude that after introducing implicit
auctions on the Slovenian-Austrian border the Austrian and Slovenian electricity
exchange prices would be brought closer together or even equalise, thereby confirming
our first hypothesis (H1).
Further, we may also conclude that, after the implementation of implicit auctions on
the Slovenian-Austrian border, the average electricity price in the Slovenian electricity
exchange market would decrease by €6.84/MWh (13%) annually, thereby confirming our
second hypothesis (H2).
Figure 3: Price comparison between Slovenian and Austrian electricity exchange markets
before and after the simulation of implicit auctions on the SI-AT border

Sources: BSP, n.d.; EXAA, n.d.
Sources: BSP, n.d.; EXAA, n.d.
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after the implementing of implicit auctions is shown in Figure 5. All points representing efficiently used CZCs are
on the y-axis and in the marked area on the left and right sides of the y-axis.
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5.4.

their quantity in the opposite direction is the result of the higher usage of the available quantity of long-term
CZCs in the direction Austria-Slovenia than in the direction Slovenia-Austria. Hence there is a smaller leftoComparison
of social welfare in Slovenia before and after the simulation of implicit auctions
ver of available CZCs in the direction Austria-Slovenia compared to the direction Slovenia-Austria.

Slovenian-Austrian border

on the

The influence of implicit auctions on the Slovenian-Austrian border on social welfare in Slovenia is described in
Table 3.
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of 2012 which reveal that if, during that period, implicit auctions had been used on the
Slovenian-Austrian border, a larger number of transactions would have been made in the
Slovenian electricity exchange market (up to 30% more) than in the case of the reference
scenario. After stabilisation, in all subsequent months a higher number of transactions
would still have been made in the Slovenian electricity exchange market than in the
reference scenario. However, the difference between both is no longer so noticeable. After
implementing implicit auctions on the Slovenian-Austrian border, the volume of trading
in the Slovenian electricity exchange market would rise by 715,633 MWh (16%) on the
annual level, which confirms our fourth hypothesis (H4).
5.4. Comparison of social welfare in Slovenia before and after the simulation of
implicit auctions on the Slovenian-Austrian border
The influence of implicit auctions on the Slovenian-Austrian border on social welfare in
Slovenia is described in Table 3.
Table 3: Change in social welfare after simulation of implicit auctions on the SI-AT border
Before implicit
auctions (€)
146,318,029
855,105,950
1,001,423,979

After implicit
auctions (€)
119,998,678
890,547,561
1,010,546,239

/
/
/

8,326,379
795,881
9,122,260

Congestion rent on the SI-AT border
Congestion rent on the SI-IT border
Total congestion rent
Change in collected congestion rent

10,317,924
34,886,765
45,204,689
/

2,290,102
50,163,851
52,453,953
7,249,264

Change in social welfare in Slovenia

/

16,371,524

Producer surplus
Consumer surplus
Total producer and consumer surplus
Net benefits due to increased import from Austria
Net benefits due to increased export to Austria
Total net benefits due to exchange with Austria

Note: Congestion rent accounts for half of the congestion rent acquired annually on the SIAT and SI-IT border – the other half belongs to the Austrian or Italian TSO.
The results of the analysis show that due to the use of implicit auctions on the SlovenianAustrian border and the increased imports of cheaper electricity from the Austrian
electricity exchange market and the resulting drop in the price in the Slovenian electricity
exchange market the net benefits for Slovenia amount to €8,326,379. Due to the use of
implicit auctions on the Slovenian-Austrian border and the increased exports of electricity
to the Austrian electricity exchange market and the consequential rise in the price in the
Slovenian electricity exchange market, the net benefits for Slovenia amount to €795,881.
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For Slovenia, the total net benefits from trading between the two markets amount to
€9,122,260.
The Slovenian TSO income from the congestion rent after implementing implicit auctions
decreased to €2,290,102. The smaller amount of congestion rent on that border is expected
when considering all inefficiencies of the explicit CZC allocation due to which the amount
of congestion rent from the explicit CZC allocation is too high and does not reflect the real
economic value of CZCs.
On the other hand, the Slovenian TSO’s income from the congestion rent on the
Slovenian-Italian border increased to €50,163,851 after implementing implicit auctions
on the Slovenian-Austrian border. The increased congestion rent is expected since the
price in the Slovenian electricity exchange market decreased, which results in an increase
in the price difference in the northern zone of the Italian electricity exchange market and
the acquired congestion rent on that border.
Summarising the net benefits of the Slovenian electricity exchange market from the exports
to the Austrian electricity exchange market (in hours, when the Slovenian electricity
exchange price was lower than the Austrian electricity exchange price), the net benefits
of the Slovenian electricity exchange market from the imports to the Austrian electricity
exchange market (in hours, when the Slovenian electricity exchange price was higher than
the Austrian electricity exchange price) and the additional congestion rent gained by the
Slovenian TSO shows that social welfare increased by €16,371,524 in Slovenia. This also
confirms our fifth hypothesis (H5), which states that the use of implicit auctions on the
Slovenian-Austrian border would increase social welfare in Slovenia. The benefits of the
implementation amount to €7.91 per capita. This is in line with a recently published study
which estimated that the benefits of allocating CZC at implicit auctions within market
couplings, once fully implemented across the EU, would be between €2.5 and €4 billion
per year, or about €5 to €8 per capita per year (Booz & Company, Newbery, Strbac, Noël
& LeighFisher, 2013).
6. CONCLUSION
Due to the benefits of implicit auctions and the positive influence of this CZC allocation
method on social welfare, the European Commission has been trying to legally unify
the existing CZC allocation practices throughout Europe. In the last few years we have
witnessed considerable progress since implicit auctions within market couplings have
already been established on numerous borders of energy systems within the EU. On the
Slovenian-Austrian border, CZCs are currently allocated by means of explicit auctions.
However, in compliance with the European Target Electricity Model we can expect the
implementation of implicit auctions within market couplings in the future.
By simulating trading on the Slovenian electricity exchange market and the allocation of
CZCs following the implementation of implicit auctions within market coupling on the
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Slovenian-Austrian border for 2012, we demonstrated that in the Slovenian electricity
exchange market the electricity price would be brought closer together or even equalise
with Austrian electricity exchange market by an average decrease of €6.84/MWh, leading
to a 16% increase in the volume of trading in the Slovenian electricity exchange market.
The efficiency of CZC utilisation would increase as well. In addition, market coupling on
the Slovenian-Austrian border would increase social welfare in Slovenia by €16,371,524.
By implementing implicit auctions within the market coupling on the SlovenianAustrian border, Slovenia will fulfil its obligations imposed by the pan-European, dayahead, market-forming process. The Slovenian electricity exchange market will be partly
reformed and enable exchange market members to trade in a liquid exchange market that
is connected to the Austrian-German and Italian electricity exchange markets.
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